

¹B. Ikica, H. H. Nax, D. G. Nuñez-Duran, B. S. R. Pradelski, Feedback effects in the experimental double auction with private information. *In progress.*

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Motivation

Two-sided market Market clearing


Double auction

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Two-sided markets



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Market clearing

Market-clearing price

Can we find a price at which

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Market clearing

Market-clearing price

Can we find a price at which

• the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied

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Market clearing

Market-clearing price

Can we find a price at which

- the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied
- and no surplus or shortage exists in the market?

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Walrasian double auction

Walrasian double auction [Walras, 1883]

Buyer
$$i \in \mathcal{B} \iff$$
 budget r_i^+ , seller $j \in \mathcal{S} \iff$ production cost r_j^-

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Walrasian double auction

Walrasian double auction [Walras, 1883]

- Buyer $i \in \mathcal{B} \iff$ budget r_i^+ , seller $j \in \mathcal{S} \iff$ production cost r_j^-
- Buyers submit bids $\{b_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{B}}$, sellers submit asks $\{a_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}$

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Walrasian double auction

Walrasian double auction [Walras, 1883]

- Buyer $i \in \mathcal{B} \longrightarrow$ budget r_i^+ , seller $j \in \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow$ production cost r_i^-
- Buyers submit bids $\{b_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{B}}$, sellers submit asks $\{a_j\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}$
- An auctioneer matches them at a price π that clears the market

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
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Walrasian double auction

Competitive equilibrium

A market price π & a set of buyers and sellers involved in trade

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Walrasian double auction

Competitive equilibrium

A market price π & a set of buyers and sellers involved in trade

• Individual rationality (every agent involved weakly prefers trading at π)

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Walrasian double auction

Competitive equilibrium

A market price π & a set of buyers and sellers involved in trade

- Individual rationality (every agent involved weakly prefers trading at π)
- Envy-freenness (every agent *not* involved weakly prefers *not* trading at π)

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Walrasian double auction

Competitive equilibrium

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Competitive equilibrium

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- Individual rationality (every agent involved weakly prefers trading at π)
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- Market clearing (supply equals demand)

Range of competitive equilibria: $[\underline{\pi}, \overline{\pi}]$

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Experimental economics

Central empirical question

Should competitive equilibria be expected in real-world markets?

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Experimental economics

Central empirical question

Should competitive equilibria be expected in real-world markets?

1962 Vernon L. Smith \longrightarrow 2002 Nobel Prize in economics

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Experimental set-up

• Reservation prices: $\{r_i^+\}_{i \in \mathcal{B}}, \{r_j^-\}_{j \in \mathcal{S}}.$

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- Reservation prices: $\{r_i^+\}_{i\in\mathcal{B}}, \{r_j^-\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}.$
- Bids {b_i^{t,T}}_{i∈B} and asks {a_j^{t,T}}_{j∈S} are placed for a single identical good, T ∈ N.

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- If $i \in \mathcal{B}$ buys for $\pi \in [r_j^-, r_i^+]$ from $j \in \mathcal{S}$:

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$\mathsf{Experimental} \ \mathsf{set-up}$

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- Reservation prices: $\{r_i^+\}_{i\in\mathcal{B}}, \{r_j^-\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}$.
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- If $i \in \mathcal{B}$ buys for $\pi \in [r_j^-, r_i^+]$ from $j \in \mathcal{S}$:

payoff
$$= egin{cases} r_i^+ - \pi, & i \in \mathcal{B} \ \pi - r_j^-, & j \in \mathcal{S} \end{cases}$$

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- Reservation prices: $\{r_i^+\}_{i\in\mathcal{B}}, \{r_j^-\}_{j\in\mathcal{S}}$.
- Bids $\{b_i^{t,T}\}_{i \in \mathcal{B}}$ and asks $\{a_j^{t,T}\}_{j \in \mathcal{S}}$ are placed for a single identical good, $T \in \mathbb{N}$.
- If $i \in \mathcal{B}$ buys for $\pi \in [r_j^-, r_i^+]$ from $j \in \mathcal{S}$:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \textit{payoff} & = & \begin{cases} r_i^+ - \pi, & i \in \mathcal{B} \\ \pi - r_j^-, & j \in \mathcal{S} \end{cases} \\ \textit{gain of trade} & = & r_i^+ - r_j^- \end{cases}$$

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Sellers



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Sellers



Buyers

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
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
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
Double auction


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105 €

95 €

113 €

•

90 €



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
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Equilibrium price range: [98, 103], gains of trade: 170 \in

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
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prices

Experimental market



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prices

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Experimental market

	batch_name	game	period	time	id	side	valuation	bid_value	price
500	FullInfo	1	4	606	20	Buyer	108	102	nan
501	FullInfo	1	4	606	10	Buyer	133	102	nan
502	FullInfo	1	4	606	8	Buyer	138	115	115
503	FullInfo	1	4	606	14	Buyer	123	99	nan
504	FullInfo	1	4	607	18	Buyer	113	101	nan
505	FullInfo	1	4	609	17	Seller	108	120	nan
506	FullInfo	1	4	610	6	Buyer	143	102	nan
507	FullInfo	1	4	611	20	Buyer	108	103	nan
508	FullInfo	1	4	611	15	Seller	103	120	nan
509	FullInfo	1	4	611	16	Buyer	118	105	105
510	FullInfo	1	4	611	22	Buyer	103	90	nan

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Treatments

• Feedback: black box, same, other, full.

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Treatments

- Feedback: black box, same, other, full.
- **Price mechanisms**: first price, random price, matchkeeper keeps.

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Convergence to competitive prices

• Feedback: black box, same, other, full.

Treatments

- **Price mechanisms**: first price, random price, matchkeeper keeps.
- Market structures: regular (10 buyers, 10 sellers, 10 rounds), asymmetric buy-side (20 buyers), asymmetric sell-side (20 sellers), long (50 rounds).

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osf.io/gu62n

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Overview of all treatments

Batch name	Feedback	# Games	
FullInfo	full	first	5
OwnInfo	same	first	5
OtherInfo	other	first	5
MatchmakerKeepsOwn	same	mmk_keeps	4
BlackBox	blackbox	first	5
MatchmakerRandomizes	blackbox	random	5
MatchmakerKeepsBlackBox	blackbox	mmk_keeps	5
AsymmetricFull	full	first	5
AsymmetricBlackBox	blackbox	first	5
AsymmetricReverseFull	full	first	5
AsymmetricReverseBlackBox	blackbox	first	5
MorePeriods	blackbox	first	5
LargeCore	full	first	8
LargeCoreBlackbox	blackbox	first	8
MarketShift	full	first	5
ChangingAsymmetry	full	first	5
ChangingAsymmetryInv	full	first	5

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
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Convergence to competitive prices

FullInfo: full feedback, first price



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
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OwnInfo: same-side feedback, first price



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
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OtherInfo: other-side feedback, first price



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
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BlackBox: blackbox feedback, first price



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
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MatchmakerRandomizes: blackbox feedback, random price



0.0		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	B	8	8	8	9	8	7	7	7	7	7
	S	7	8	8	7	8	8	8	7	8	8
		10	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
	IS	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	B	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	IS	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6
	B	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	8
	IS	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9
	B	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	S	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

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
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MatchmakerKeepsOwn: same feedback, matchmaker-keeps price



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
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MatchmakerKeepsBlackBox: blackbox feedback, matchmaker-keeps price



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
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AsymmetricFull: full feedback, first price



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
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AsymmetricBlackBox: blackbox feedback, first price



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
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AsymmetricReverseFull: full feedback, first price



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
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AsymmetricReverseBlackBox: blackbox feedback, first price



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
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MorePeriods: blackbox feedback, first price



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
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LargeCore: full feedback, first price



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
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LargeCoreBlackbox: blackbox feedback, first price



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
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MarketShift: full feedback, first price



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
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ChangingAsymmetry: full feedback, first price



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ChangingAsymmetryInv: full feedback, first price

